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Abstract
Over the past three years, several new projects with the potential for major modifications 
to existing facilities have been considered for implementation at the Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL).  These projects were designated to take place in existing nuclear facilities with existing 
documented safety analyses.  10 CFR 830.2061 requires the contractor for a major modification 
to a Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility to obtain Department of Energy (DOE) approval 
for the nuclear facility design criteria to be used for preparation of a preliminary documented 
safety analysis (PDSA), as well as creation and approval of the PDSA, before the contractor can 
procure materials or components or begin construction on the project.  Given the significant 
effort and expense of preparation and approval of a PDSA, a major modification determination 
for new projects is warranted to determine if the rigorous requirements of a major modification 
are actually required.  Furthermore, performing a major modification determination helps to 
ensure that important safety aspects of a project are appropriately considered prior to 
modification construction or equipment procurement. 
The projects considered for major modification status at the INL included: treatment and 
packaging of unirradiated, sodium-bonded highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and 
miscellaneous casting scrap in the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Fuel Manufacturing 
Facility (FMF); post irradiation examination of Advance Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) fuel in the 
MFC Analytical Laboratory (AL); the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) gas test loop (GTL); and 
the hydraulic shuttle irradiation system (HSIS) at ATR.  The major modification determinations 
for three of the proposed projects resulted in a negative major modification.  On the other hand, 
the major modification determination for the GTL project concluded that the project would 
require a major modification. 
This paper discusses the process, methods, and considerations used by the INL for the four 
major modification determinations.  Three of the four major modification determinations 
discussed herein were completed using the guidance specified in the draft of DOE-STD-1189, 
“Integration of Safety into the Design Process.”2 DOE-STD-1189 was released as a draft 
document in March 2007 and provides guidance for integrating safety considerations into the 
early design activities for constructing new facilities or making modifications to existing nuclear 
facilities.  The fourth major modification determination was prepared prior to the existence of 
DOE-STD-1189 and was evaluated solely by the definition of a major modification given in 
10 CFR 830.206.  For all four projects, consideration was given to: 
? Facility hazard categorization change and material inventory 
? Facility footprint change with the potential to adversely affect credited safety function 
? New or changed processes resulting in a change to the safety basis 
? The use of new technology or equipment not approved for use in the facility 
? The need for new or revised safety basis controls 
? Hazards not previously evaluated in the safety basis.
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1. Overview of the INL 
The INL is a government-owned reservation located in southeastern Idaho (see Figure 1), 
approximately 25 miles west of Idaho Falls, Idaho.  The INL was first established in 1949 as the 
National Reactor Testing Station (NTS) used for a construction and testing area for various 
experimental and research reactor programs, reactor fuels, structural components, materials, and 
reactor safety programs.  The INL site covers an area of approximately 890 mi2.  The INL is 
currently operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) under a 10-year contract with DOE.  
Current missions of the INL include developing nuclear reactor technologies and supporting 
national security programs, advanced fuel development, spent fuel treatment, and other science 
and technology programs. 
Figure 1. Location of the INL Site. 
Materials and Fuels Complex 
MFC is the easternmost facility located on the INL.  Formerly known as Argonne National 
Laboratory –West and operated by the University of Chicago, the MFC site covers an area of 
approximately 890 acres.  Construction of the MFC site began in the mid-1950s with the 
Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) and support facilities, following the successful 
demonstration of the EBR-I reactor which is also located on the INL reserve.  The EBR-II 
program, which is no longer in operation, was developed for research and development of liquid 
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metal fast breeder reactor technology.  Facilities currently operated at MFC include the 
following:
? The Fuel Cycle Facility (FCF) is adjacent to the EBR-II facility.  During EBR-II 
operations, this inert atmosphere hot cell facility was used as a support facility for 
subassembly dismantling, as well as fuel reprocessing and fuel pin casting for return to 
the reactor.  The current mission of FCF is to process and stabilize blanket fuel from 
reactor programs.  
? The Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF) is an inert atmosphere hot cell facility. HFEF 
was constructed to support irradiated fuel and hardware examination programs for 
EBR-II and other DOE complex-wide projects.  The Neutron Radiography Reactor 
(NRAD) is a 250 KW Training, Research, and Isotope, General Atomics (TRIGA) reactor 
located within HFEF.  HFEF is also the home of the Waste Isolation Pilot Program 
(WIPP) verification project for performing visual examination of contact handled 
transuranic waste being shipped to the New Mexico WIPP repository.  
? The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) located one mile west of the main MFC 
compound, is an air-cooled uranium-oxide reactor, which was used in reactor fuels and 
materials safety experiments using short, controlled bursts of high power nuclear energy.
TREAT is currently maintained in standby pending further project identification.
? The Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) is currently in non-operational standby status.  
This reactor was designed for studying the properties of liquid-metal reactor cores at low 
power.  When operational, experimental cores were built in ZPPR by hand-loading plates 
of reactor material into drawers. These reactor materials include uranium, plutonium, 
sodium, and stainless steel.  
? The Laboratory and Office (L&O) Building consists of small hot cells, gloveboxes, 
waste-form-development equipment, and general-purpose chemistry laboratories. The AL 
is located within the L&O.  The mission of the AL is to provide chemical, radiochemical, 
and physical measurements in support of MFC and INL nuclear and environmental 
programs.  
? The Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) was constructed in 1986 to house fuel 
manufacturing operations in support of EBR-II. Since the shut down of EBR-II, FMF has 
been converted to a multiuse research and development (R&D) facility.  
? The Space and Security Power Source Facility (SSPSF) provides the capability for 
assembly and acceptance testing of radioisotope power systems (RPS) to be used in 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) deep space missions and other 
security applications relying on an integral, secure, and long term power source.  
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? The Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF) processes low-level 
radioactive liquid waste generated at MFC. The facilities supported by RLWTF are 
EBR-II, HFEF, TREAT, ZPPR, FCF, and the AL. RLWTF is capable of evaporating 
approximately 227,000 L (60,000 gal) of radioactive liquid annually; the resulting residue 
is low-level radioactive solid waste which is packaged and stored in an environmentally 
acceptable form for interim-storage or shallow-land burial. 
Figure 2 is an aerial view showing the major MFC facilities discussed above. 
Figure 2. MFC major facilities. 
Reactor Test Complex 
The Reactor Test Complex (RTC) is a multipurpose experimental reactor facility complex 
located in the southwestern region of the INL, approximately 50 miles west of Idaho Falls.  
Formerly known as the Test Reactor Area, RTC was established in the early 1950s and remains a 
premier DOE facility supporting national nuclear technology research missions.  The primary 
function of RTC is to maintain and operate the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), the world’s 
premier and largest test reactor, which is used to study the effects of irradiation of reactor fuels 
and structural materials.  ATR also produces a rare supply of valuable medical and industrial 
isotopes.  The reactor’s unique design and high neutron flux provides an opportunity for 
researchers to collect data, which would normally require years to gather in a conventional 
reactor, in a matter of weeks or months.  Historically, the primary user of ATR has been the U. S. 
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.  More recently the facility has served multiple users in other 
government, commercial, and international missions.  The reactor core is arranged in a unique 
clover leaf pattern, which provides nine large test spaces with additional smaller test spaces also 
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available.  The core structural components are periodically replaced in ATR, providing a 
consistently pristine environment for conducting high temperature, high pressure, and high flux 
experiments.   
Other support facilities at RTC include:
? The Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility is a low-power, full size mockup duplicate 
of the ATR core and provides physics data in support of ATR test programs.   
? The TRA Hot Cell Facility has three shielded hot cells equipped with remote-operated 
tools, measuring instruments, and manipulators.  The cells are used to examine highly 
radioactive samples from ATR and to process radioisotopes produced in ATR.
? The Radiochemistry Laboratory is used to support the Radiation Measurements 
Laboratory as well as to perform independent research and development projects.   
? The Safety and Tritium Applications Research (STAR) Facility is used by national and 
international scientists performing fusion-related research and development for the DOE 
Office of Fusion Energy Science.
Figure 3 is an aerial view showing the major RTC facilities discussed above. 
Figure 3. RTC major facilities. 
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2. Major Modification Requirement for Proposed Projects 
The Nuclear Safety Management Rule is found in 10 CFR 8301 and defines a major 
modification as “a modification to a DOE nuclear facility that is completed on or after 
April 9, 2001, that substantially changes the existing safety basis for the facility.”  Section 206 of 
the same part further directs that for changes to a Hazard Category (HC) 1, 2, or 3 nuclear 
facility meeting the definition of “major modification,” the contractor must: (a) prepare a PDSA 
for the facility, and (b) obtain DOE approval of:
? The nuclear safety design criteria used in preparing the PDSA unless the 
contractor uses the design criteria in DOE Order 420.1, “Facility Safety,” and  
? The PDSA. 
These approvals are required before the contractor can procure materials or components or 
begin construction.  DOE may authorize the contractor to perform limited procurement and 
construction activities without approval of a PDSA if DOE determines that the activities are not 
detrimental to public health and safety and are in the best interest of DOE.
Preparation of a PDSA involves significant time and capital expenditure.  Given the tight 
budget and schedules under which most projects operate, it is important that only those projects 
which truly meet the definition of a major modification are subjected to the full PDSA process.
Over the past three years, four new projects being located in nuclear facilities at the INL have 
been evaluated for “major modification” status to determine if a PDSA was warranted.  The 
following sections will discuss the proposed projects and the process utilized at the INL to make 
the final major modification determinations.   
3. INL Proposed Projects 
The following four subsections describe the four proposed projects that were reviewed at 
the INL for major modification determination.  Two of the projects were proposed at RTC and 
two were proposed at MFC. 
Treatment and Packaging of Unirradiated, Sodium-bonded HEU Fuel3
The treatment and packaging of unirradiated, sodium-bonded HEU fuel and miscellaneous 
casting scrap project is aimed to process and package HEU materials currently stored at MFC’s 
FMF for secure transfer to a designated DOE receiving facility.  The specific HEU materials 
include approximately 7,500 unirradiated sodium-bonded EBR-II and DOE Hanford site Fast 
Flux Test Facility (FFTF) driver fuel elements and nearly 800 kg of HEU casting scrap from the 
process that formed various sodium-bonded fuels.  The sodium bonding will be removed from 
the fuel elements in order to recover the HEU fuel and package it for off-site transport.  The 
HEU scrap will also require repackaging in preparation for off-site transport.  
Element processing begins with removing a batch size quantity of elements from storage.  
A batch will consist of 144 EBR-II elements or 72 FFTF elements that contain between 4.6 and 
7.2 kg of U-235, depending upon the type of elements being processed.  The elements are moved 
2008 EFCOG Safety Analysis Working Group              Page 8 of 18 
to the disassembly station where the spacer wire removal shears are located.  This equipment is 
used to shear each end of the spacer wires so that it can be removed from the elements.  Removal 
of the spacer wires is necessary so that the elements can be subsequently sectioned to remove the 
plenum ends.  The elements are moved into an inert, argon atmosphere sodium recovery 
glovebox where the plenum ends are removed with a tubing cutting tool.  A batch of elements is 
loaded into the melt-drain-evaporate (MEDE) process vessel, which is located within the 
glovebox.  The process vessel is closed, and the process vessel pressure is reduced to 
approximately 200 mTorr or less.  The process vessel is heated to approximately 640ºC to melt, 
drain, and finally evaporate the sodium from the elements.  The sodium vapor is driven to a 
condenser where it is collected for subsequent transfer to and treatment in an MFC Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitted facility.  Depending upon the element type, 
each batch of elements will remove 100 to 450 grams of sodium.  Once the sodium removal 
process step is completed, the process vessel is allowed to cool.  The elements are removed from 
the process vessel, and the HEU fuel slugs are removed from the cladding.  Using a shear within 
the glovebox, the slugs are sized as necessary for packaging. 
The HEU casting scrap is currently contained within metal containers in storage.  Based on 
a critically safe mass limit of 10 kg U-235 for a given processing batch, and assuming each 
current storage can contains nominally 1.4 kg of material, seven of the current storage cans 
would be processed at a time and during one work shift.  The containers are transferred into the 
glovebox where they are opened and consolidated into the approved packaging for shipment.  
The FMF south workroom was identified as the preferred location for this project.  FMF is 
operated with the necessary safeguards and security controls for handling the materials.  In 
addition, once several pieces of unused equipment are removed from the south workroom, there 
is ample room for the new process equipment.  FMF also has an existing high-efficiency 
particulate air (HEPA) filter ventilation system that will be modified for this project.   
Several pieces of new equipment will be installed in the designated workroom to process 
and package the fuel elements, the intact fuel assemblies, and the casting scrap.  The new 
glovebox, which will contain the sodium removal process equipment, will be installed in the 
FMF south workroom.  This glovebox will contain an inert argon atmosphere to support 
operations with reactive and potentially pyrophoric materials (i.e., sodium and uranium metals at 
elevated temperatures).  A mill and support stands, which will be used in the disassembly of the 
fuel assemblies, will be installed.  A disassembly station will be installed that will be used in the 
disassembly of the fuel assemblies.  The disassembly station will also contain support equipment 
to remove the spacer wires from the elements. 
Process equipment includes the necessary equipment to prepare, treat, and package the 
unirradiated fuel elements and assemblies such as: a mill to support disassembly of fuel 
assemblies; spacer wire removal shears; an element chopper to cut the elements to a size 
accommodated by the fuel processing baskets; MEDE equipment to evaporate, remove, 
condense, and collect the sodium from the fuel pins; fuel slug shears; a balance to accurately 
measure material for control and accountability records; and a storage container lid sealer to 
install a lid on the container of recovered fuel slugs. 
2008 EFCOG Safety Analysis Working Group              Page 9 of 18 
Hazards associated with this project are releases of unirradiated U-235 from accidents, 
including handling events; hydrogen gas buildup from the inert atmosphere purification system; 
and sodium reactions associated with evaporating, draining, condensing, packaging, and storing 
the sodium in the fuel pins.  
Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative Post Irradiation Examination in the MFC AL4
This proposed activity is to develop a portion of the MFC AL basement into a shielded 
enclosure laboratory to be used for additional examination and analysis of advanced fuel cycle 
initiative (AFCI) post irradiated fuel samples. The project is funded by DOE to support the 
primary mission of the INL in developing fuels and materials for a new generation of 
commercial nuclear power plants.
As proposed, experimental fuel types will be irradiated for a period of time in the INL 
ATR. After the predetermined irradiation, the fuel will be removed from the reactor experiment 
port and transported via shielded cask to the MFC HFEF. After initial examination in the HFEF 
hot cells, a sub-sample will be prepared and transported by an existing pneumatic transfer system 
to the AL where it will be loaded into one of the shielded enclosures. Once in the shielded 
enclosure, the samples will be analyzed using sensitive equipment. Results of these analyses are 
important in the development of new reactor programs. 
In order to install the post irradiation experiment (PIE) equipment and associated support 
equipment, various existing electrical and mechanical utilities and services require relocation. 
Additionally, structural modifications will be necessary to accommodate the shielding required 
to safely handle the samples and to operate the equipment.  These modifications also include 
replacement of existing HEPA filters and filter housings currently in use. The enclosure inlet and 
outlet ventilation ducts are equipped with a HEPA filter and an automated louver with motor 
where the work enclosures are breached. The HEPA filters assure contamination control, and the 
louvers/motor assemblies control the pressure in the enclosures. In addition, this air flow control 
system will maintain enclosure temperatures and humidity according to the in-cell equipment 
operating requirements. 
Process equipment includes three main pieces of analytical equipment and the support 
equipment for each.   
The focused ion beam (FIB) detector system is a dual beam characterization instrument 
used to image and characterize the composition of solid materials as well as perform 
nano-machining of samples to prepare them for further analysis. Imaging is performed using a 
Schottky Field Emitter, which produces a beam of electrons that interact with the sample on a 
small scale. Depth of penetration of the beam into the sample depends on the material and the 
electron energy but is generally less than 100 nm. Interaction of the electrons with the sample 
material results in the production of backscattered electrons, secondary electrons, and 
characteristic x-rays. Detectors are situated around the FIB to detect the signals and allow for 
interrogation of the sample. Backscattered and secondary electron signals are used primarily for 
image analysis. Spectrometry of excitation released gamma rays is analyzed to determine 
elemental composition of the sample.  The ion beam can also be used to locally remove or mill 
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away material from the sample. This is accomplished by sputtering atoms from the sample 
because of the large mass collision of the ion collision compared to an electron impact. 
The electron probe microanalyzer (EPMA) is an instrument used to quantitatively measure 
the composition of solid materials from elements with an atomic number as low as 4 (Be). The 
application of electric current to a filament (typically tungsten) produces a beam of electrons 
which interact with the sample on a small scale, typically a circle 1 to 300 ?m in diameter. Depth 
of penetration of the beam into the sample depends on the material but is generally around 1 ?m. 
Interaction of the electrons with the material results in the production of backscattered electrons, 
secondary electrons, and characteristic x-rays. Detectors are situated around the EPMA to detect 
these signals and allow for interrogation of the sample. Backscattered and secondary electron 
signals are used primarily for image analysis. X-rays pass through crystals of varying d-spacing, 
which allows for discrimination of specific wavelengths from the x-ray continuum. These are 
processed by a gas proportional detector and a matrix correction algorithm, allowing for 
quantitative chemical analysis of the material.  Sample material can be either solid or particulate 
but must undergo a specific preparation procedure to use the EPMA’s analytical capabilities. For 
a typical sample holder, the volume of the sample is limited to about 11 cm3. Samples must be 
cut to size to fit, must be polished to a 1 ?m finish, and must be coated if they are not conductive. 
Often, samples (both solids and particulate) are mounted in a metallographic mount (a hollow 
cylinder or ring) with epoxy, exposed to a vacuum to outgas the sample, and then polished and 
coated. This allows for samples far smaller than 11 cm3 to be appropriately mounted in the 
sample holder so that the sample top is flat and parallel to the top of the sample holder. In 
addition, particulate samples prepared in this fashion become fixed in epoxy and are far safer to 
handle.
The micro-scale x-ray diffractometer (MXRD) generates x-rays at a source, directs them 
into a sample, and uses a detector to measure the intensity of the x-rays diffracted by the sample 
as a function of the angular relationship between the source and the detector (2?). In a 
theta-theta diffractometer, the source and detector both change angles, and the sample doesn’t. 
The MXRD is expected to use two kinds of samples: powders and solids. When dealing with 
nonradioactive samples, powders are typically either glued to some kind of surface or contained 
in a depression in a thicker sample holder. Powders contained in depressions may be covered by 
x-ray transparent covers. 
Hazards associated with this project are primarily release of irradiated fuel from several 
scenarios such as: material spill from drops; natural phenomena hazard such as earthquakes or 
tornados resulting in a breach of the confinement boundary or failure of shielding components; 
hydrogen accidents from the accumulation of hydrogen from a malfunction of the atmosphere 
purification system; or a major facility fire resulting in damage to confinement boundaries and 
subsequent release. 
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ATR GTL5
The GTL is a proposed modification to the facility which will require changes to the 
current ATR core configuration and safety basis.  Even though the proposed modifications do 
not involve major construction commitments, change will be required to the reactor core and 
subsequent changes to the safety basis.  The nature of these changes were evaluated to determine 
if the 10 CFR 830 established criteria of “substantial” changes to the safety basis exist.
The GTL concept calls for a design which will incorporate a significant amount of 
“booster” fuel being added to one lobe of the ATR to gain the requisite fast neutron flux in the 
test region.  It was determined that with the additional fuel and fissioning in that area, a 
significant increase in primary cooling would be required.  The existing water coolant is 
adequate to meet the projected additional 6 to 7 MW thermal of the loop.  An additional 
requirement will be that the lobe associated with the GTL will need to be operated at a power 
level of at least 40 MW in order to achieve the required fast neutron flux for the test loop.
Currently, that reactor lobe is limited to a maximum power level of 34 MW per the existing ATR 
safety analysis report (SAR).  This increase in power represents a significant step up from 
current levels for that lobe.   
The booster fuel will be positioned in a modified version of existing flux trap baffles used 
to position reactor fuel elements.  The flux trap baffles are identified in the ATR SAR as 
safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) required to ensure (a) the integrity of 
the primary coolant pressure boundary, (b) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it 
in a safe shutdown condition, and (c) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of 
accidents that result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 guidelines.  The 
ATR SAR also identifies the ATR fuel elements as safety-related equipment in that the fuel 
cladding serves as the first and foremost barrier to provide retention of reactor fission and 
transmutation products within the fuel.  The GTL project proposes to add approximately 4.7 kg 
of U-235 booster fuel to the existing inventory in that lobe.  The new fuel elements will likewise 
be considered safety-related, consistent with the existing fuel designation and will, therefore, be 
new safety-related equipment.  Safety analyses are anticipated to determine the responses of new 
fuel and the added cooling burden in that lobe of the reactor with respect to postulated ATR 
accidents.  The ATR operating power is measured by two systems: a thermal power calculator 
that measures thermal power in each of the four reactor quadrants and a lobe power calculator 
that is used to determine applicable operating power in each of the nine reactor flux traps or 
lobes.  The thermal power calculation is based on measurements of the reactor coolant water as it 
passes through each or the four reactor core quadrants.  The lobe power calculations are based on 
an independent system taking discrete measurements at several locations within the core.  Both 
power measurement systems are designated as safety-related equipment.  Clearly, both systems 
will be impacted by the significant change in fuel and power ratings. The GTL proposal, 
therefore, requires design changes to several reactor components or systems designated as 
safety-related equipment.   
The GTL concept will require a sustained and long-term fast neutron flux to be maintained 
in the area of this test loop.  The current ATR SAR limits the time of reactor operation at high 
powers.  Changes to the SAR will be needed to justify operation at the needed levels for the 
GTL.
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The additional fuel for the GTL booster fuel will be elements using a new fissile material 
form that is not currently addressed in the ATR safety basis.  Supporting thermal, stress, 
criticality safety, and other accident analyses will be performed to provide safety basis support 
for the necessary changes for this project. 
ATR HSIS6
The HSIS is being installed in the ATR to provide the capability of inserting small shuttle 
capsules containing target material into the reactor core. This allows the material to be irradiated 
and retrieved all without shutting down the reactor.  This change in operating capability will 
result in greater reactor efficiency while reducing personnel radiation exposure.  The shuttles are 
loaded into the system at a Send and Receive Station (SRS), located in the ATR fuel storage 
canal and transported to the ATR through piping installed between the canal and the reactor 
vessel.  After irradiation, the shuttle will be transported back through the same piping to the SRS.  
The system is controlled by remote- and manual-operated control valves and cooled by reactor 
primary coolant water.
The in-core shuttle concept was previously used in ATR in the mid-1960s, including a 
system which was used through the 1980s but later removed to provide space for another project.  
At that time some of the system components were removed and never reinstalled due to lack of 
funding.  New ATR programs and its demanding schedule will benefit from the capability 
provided by restoring this feature.
Construction activities include installation of transport tubing, valves, and the SRS for 
insertion and removal of the shuttles containing the research target material.  The SRS will be 
installed at the west end of the canal and submerged to a depth of approximately 8 ft.  Tubing 
will be installed from the SRS, through the canal wall, through the nozzle trench, and into the 
reactor vessel. 
The HSIS can be separated into four major subsystems: the in-tank components, the 
out-of-tank components, the canal SRS station, and the shuttles themselves as follows:   
1) The in-tank components include the transport and instrumentation piping from the 
reactor tank flange and inward, and also the in-pile portion of the system 
transporting the shuttle from the out-of-core piping to the irradiation position, 
including a position indicator to show that the shuttle has seated into the correct 
position.
2) The out-of-tank components include the lines connected to the reactor flange; the 
transport, bypass, high pressure, and instrumentation lines; and the tubing shielding 
where they pass through personnel-accessible areas between the reactor vessel and 
the SRS.  Also included are isolation valves and flow meters.  This system 
additionally will provide a means for isolating the primary coolant of the reactor 
vessel from the remainder of the HSIS. 
3) The canal station includes a support rack, the SRS, isolation valves, and 
instrumentation.  These components are submerged for shielding purposes. 
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4) The titanium shuttles are the transport vehicle for target material into and out of the 
reactor.  In addition to transporting, the shuttle provides a primary containment 
boundary between the target material and the primary coolant and a confinement 
boundary to prevent release to the atmosphere.  Each shuttle will be given a service 
life of a maximum 180 exposure cycles. 
Potential hazards associated with the HSIS are consistent with other hazards of an 
operating test reactor. One hazard would result from failure of the shuttle and potential for 
release of irradiated target material either within the reactor core, to the transport line, or at the 
SRS.  The SRS and sections of the transport line are located outside the containment and present 
the potential for an uptake exposure path to personnel and the environment.  Another hazard 
exists from direct radiation exposure as the shuttle returns to the SRS from the reactor core, or 
from a “stuck” shuttle.  A third operational hazard exists from the potential reactivity changes to 
the reactor core from the shuttle or target material as it is inserted and removed from the reactor. 
These hazards are not new to the ATR operation.  Drop-in capsules have long been used 
which will be similar to the third potential hazard condition discussed above.  The other hazards 
will be analyzed to determine if they fall within the existing safety envelope for both risk and 
probability.  It is recognized that additional controls may be required, such as shielding for the 
transport tube and a shuttle recovery plan.  However, new or high-cost SSCs are not anticipated 
to properly mitigate these hazards. 
4. DOE-STD-1189 Major Modification Evaluation Criteria 
As discussed earlier, 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, “Nuclear Safety Management,” dictates that 
a PDSA is required for major modifications to Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facilities.  
In an attempt to gain more consistency throughout the DOE complex in determining what meets 
this subjective definition, DOE-STD-11892 was drafted. The draft standard includes a table, 
included herein as Table 1, “PDSA Evaluation Criteria.”  The purpose of Table 1 is to focus on 
the nature of the modification and the associated impact on the existing facility safety basis of 
the affected facility.  The draft guidance for applying the table states that in applying the criteria, 
the intent is not to automatically trigger the need for a PDSA if one or more of the criteria are 
met.  Rather, it is intended that each criterion be assessed individually and an integrated 
evaluation be performed based on the collective set of individual results. In performing this 
evaluation, the focus should be on the nature of the modification and its associated impact on the 
existing facility safety basis.  Thus even a project that results in changes that ripple through the 
safety basis documents does not “substantially change the existing safety basis for the facility” 
solely because many parts or pages of the safety basis documentation need to be revised.
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Table 1. DOE-STD-1189 PDSA needs evaluation. 
PDSA Needs Evaluation 
Project Information
Criterion No. Evaluation Criteria Evaluation  
1
Add a new building or facility with 
a material inventory > HC 3 
inventory limits or increase the 
HC of an existing facility? 
2
Change the footprint of an 
existing HC 1, 2, or 3 facility with 
the potential to adversely impact 
any credited safety function? 
3
Change an existing process or 
add a new process resulting in a 
Safety Basis change requiring 
DOE approval? 
4
Utilize new technology or GFE 
not currently in use or not 
previously formally reviewed / 
approved by DOE for the 
affected facility? 
5
Create the need for new or 
revised Safety Basis controls 
(hardware or administrative)? 
6
Involve a hazard not previously 
evaluated in the DSA? 
Summary and Recommendation:
5. Application of DOE-STD-1189  
for Three INL Proposed Projects 
Table 2 below shows application of the criteria from Table 1 to three of the four proposed 
INL projects.  The GTL project major modification determination was completed prior to 
issuance of the draft of DOE-STD-1189, and therefore, that particular determination did not use 
the format found in the table.  A narrative of the equivalent evaluation used for the GTL project 
will be discussed in the next section.
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Table 2. Application of DOE-STD-1189 PDSA needs evaluation to three proposed INL projects. 
PDSA Needs Evaluation 
Evaluation
Criterion
No. Evaluation Criteria 
Treatment and Packaging of 
Unirradiated Sodium-bonded HEU Fuel AFCI Post Irradiation Examination ATR HSIS 
1 Add a new building 
or facility with a 
material inventory 
>HC 3 inventory 
limits or increase 
the HC of an 
existing facility?
The project does not involve the addition of 
a new building, nor will it increase the 
hazard categorization of the existing facility.  
FMF is a HC-2 facility and will remain so 
with this new project.  
The project does not involve the addition of a 
new building or facility. It will not change the 
hazard categorization of the facility.  The AL 
is a HC-3 facility, and it will remain so.  The 
projected maximum sample size is limited by 
the sensitivity of the equipment used for the 
analyses.
ATR is already classified as HC-1 nuclear 
facility.  The addition of the HSIS will not 
change the hazard classification.  The specific 
hazard of each type of material placed in the 
shuttles will be reviewed and approved prior 
to use. 
2 Change the footprint 
of an existing HC 1, 
2, or 3 facility with 
the potential to 
adversely impact 
any credited safety 
function?
The project changes the footprint of the 
facility in that the new glovebox will replace 
an existing glovebox and two chemical 
handling hoods.  The size of the facility will 
not change.  
The building size will not change.  The 
basement area of the AL is currently not used 
as a radiological material examination area, so 
the usage of that area will change.  
Appropriate changes will be made in the 
existing safety basis documents.  As an HC-3 
facility, there are no SSCs which have been 
identified as essential to reduce hazards to 
acceptable levels; therefore, there is no 
potential to impact any credited safety 
function.
The actual footprint of the ATR is not 
changed.  The significant additions with this 
project include a transport tube and the send 
receive station.  The installation will impact 
the primary pressure boundary, the 
confinement, and the ATR fuel storage canal. 
3 Change an existing 
process or add a 
new process 
resulting in a Safety 
Basis change 
requiring DOE 
approval?
This project will add a new process (the 
MEDE system) for sodium removal.  The 
process will increase the quantity of sodium 
from 100 grams, currently allowed, to 
433 grams based on a 72 element batch of 
FFTF fuel.  This addition will require a 
safety basis change requiring DOE approval.  
This project will add a process to the existing 
and evaluated processes in the AL.  The added 
process is similar to the evaluated processes in 
that small irradiated fuel samples containing 
both actinide and fission products will be 
examined in a shielded remote-operated 
environment.  The PIE project will not result 
in a safety basis change requiring DOE 
approval.
The installation of the HSIS will result in 
modification of one engineered safety feature 
(the confinement) and will also result in the 
modification of one safety related component 
(the canal liner).  Those components will be 
tested for acceptable performance after the 
construction is complete. The description of 
the HSIS will be added to the ATR SAR and 
DOE approval obtained.   
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PDSA Needs Evaluation 
Evaluation
Criterion
No. Evaluation Criteria 
Treatment and Packaging of 
Unirradiated Sodium-bonded HEU Fuel AFCI Post Irradiation Examination ATR HSIS 
4 Utilize new 
technology or 
government 
furnished equipment 
(GFE) not currently 
in use or not 
previously formally 
reviewed / approved 
by DOE for the 
affected facility?
The project installs and utilizes MEDE 
equipment, which is new to the facility.  The 
MEDE is not GFE and is not new 
technology.  The MEDE process has been 
used extensively at MFC to remove the 
bonded-sodium from over 1,700 unirradiated 
EBR-II driver and blanket elements that had 
cladding defects.  More recent tests have also 
been conducted with the evaporative 
removal of sodium from Fermi blanket fuel. 
The equipment which will be installed and 
used in the AFCI PIE is not new technology 
and is not GFE.  Instruments with similar 
technology have been approved and are in use 
in the affected facility.
A shuttle system was previously operated in 
ATR in the 1970s and 1980s.  There are 
differences in system design from the 
previous system, but the basic concept 
remains the same: the rapid insertion and 
removal of material. 
5 Create the need for 
new or revised 
Safety Basis 
controls (hardware 
or administrative)?
The facility fire hazards analysis and 
combustible loading restriction will be 
updated to address the MEDE process.  New 
or revised controls will be required to limit 
the accumulation of recovered sodium and 
specify functional requirements for the 
packaging of recovered sodium.
New safety basis controls will not be required 
to perform the work under the PIE project.  
Existing controls are adequate for the work to 
be performed.
New administrative controls may be added to 
the ATR TSR.  Other than the flange used for 
vessel penetration, it is not believed that any 
of the other new components will be 
classified as safety related.  Changed operator 
actions are captured in procedures.  TSR 
changes will be submitted to DOE for 
approval.  
6 Involve a hazard not 
previously 
evaluated in the 
DSA?
The MEDE system will recover sodium 
batches of up to 433 grams.  This exceeds 
the current combustible loading limit of 
100 grams established for the FMF AFCI 
glovebox.  Sodium has been addressed for 
FMF operations in the existing FMF DSA. 
The hazards involved with examination of 
epoxy mounted metallographic samples of 
irradiated fuel sections are similar to hazards 
previously evaluated under the AL DSA.
Hazards associated with the project include 
radiation events as discussed above.  These 
hazards are expected to be bounded by 
existing DSA events. 
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Table 2 illustrates how the various PDSA evaluation criteria questions were answered for 
the three projects.  It should again be noted that a positive response to one or more of the 
evaluation criteria does not automatically trigger the need for a PDSA; rather an evaluation of 
the collective affect of the changes on the safety basis should be considered.  As shown in the 
table, each of the three projects involved a new process, yet the process was determined to be 
similar to activities already bounded by the existing respective facility safety basis.  Any new 
controls required were minimal.  Hazards of these projects were determined to be similar to 
hazards included in and analyzed in existing safety basis documents.  Thus even though some 
evaluation criteria questions were answered in the affirmative, the collective impact on the safety 
basis for each facility was considered minor, and each was a negative major modification 
determination with no PDSA required.   
6. Major Modification Determination  
for the Proposed GTL Project 
The GTL project was initiated prior to publication of the draft DOE-STD-1189 and did not 
follow the standardized format presented therein.  However, an evaluative determination was 
performed on the project in a similar fashion.  ATR is already classified as a HC-1 nuclear 
reactor facility.  That classification did not change from the GTL.  The facility footprint did not 
change; only some of the components, as discussed later, were changed.  Safety functions are 
potentially impacted.  The project represents a substantial change, including new processes from 
what is described in the safety basis.  The technology used in the project is new to the facility 
and will require DOE approval for use.  New controls will be needed given the number and 
nature of the changes from existing programs.  The new fuel type and higher power levels and 
run times represent hazards not previously evaluated in the safety basis.  The results of that 
determination indicate that the project would change several safety SSCs (power indicator 
equipment, fuel element positioners, fuel cladding), add additional safety SSCs, add significant 
power to one lobe of the reactor, add new and additional reactor fuel (of a different type than is 
currently used and discussed in the SAR), and change the reactor operations from short runs to 
longer, higher power and flux runs.  With the additional fuel in the reactor core, a new criticality 
safety evaluation is needed and new thermal, stress, and accident analyses will be required.  
Collectively these findings indicated a substantial change in the safety basis for the facility.
Thus the major modification determination was positive, and a PDSA will be required as per 
10 CFR 830. 
7. Summary 
Several nuclear facilities at the INL are currently in the process of adding new programs to 
existing capabilities.  The projects are: 1) Treatment and packaging of unirradiated sodium-
bonded HEU fuel in FMF, 2) AFCI Post Irradiation Examination in the AL, 3) ATR GTL, and 
4) ATR HSIS.  Under the nuclear safety rules of 10 CFR 830, a major modification 
determination is required to assess the need for completing and receiving DOE approval for a 
PDSA prior to commencement of construction activities.
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Each of these projects was evaluated independently to determine if the proposed project 
presented a substantial change to the respective facility’s safety basis.  In doing so 
DOE-STD-1189 Draft, or an equivalent evaluation, was used as a guide to assess the extent of 
the changes and the impact that those changes would have on the existing safety basis.  
Consideration was given to: 
? Facility hazard categorization change and material inventory 
? Facility footprint change with the potential to adversely affect credited safety function 
? New or changed processes resulting in a change to the safety basis 
? The use of new technology or equipment not approved for use in the facility 
? The need for new or revised safety basis controls 
? Hazards not previously evaluated in the safety basis. 
Although each project answered in the affirmative to one or more of the above 
considerations, the overall impact on the safety basis was minimal in all projects except the ATR 
GTL project.  Significant changes with the potential to affect the safety of the facility were 
identified for that project.  Consequently, three of the four projects received negative major 
modification determinations, whereas the GTL project was given a positive determination, and a 
PDSA will be required.  For the other three projects, revisions or addendums will be completed 
for the respective SARs to add description of the new processes and new controls (administrative 
or engineered) necessary to maintain the current safety position of the facilities. 
8. References 
1. 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management,” Code of Federal Regulations, Office of the 
Federal Register, January 2005. 
2. DOE-STD-1189, “Integration of Safety into the Design Process,” draft.
3. INL/INT-07-12417, “10 CFR 830 Major Modification Determination for Treatment and 
Packaging of Unirradiated Sodium Bonded HEU Fuel and Miscellaneous Casting Scrap,” 
Idaho National Laboratory, March 2007. 
4. INL/INT-07-14008, “10 CFR 830 Major Modification Determination for AFCI Fuel Post 
Irradiation Examination in the MFC Analytical Laboratory,” Idaho National Laboratory, 
March 2008. 
5. INEEL/EXT-05-00080, “White Paper – Advanced Test Reactor Gas Test Loop 
10 CFR 830 Major Modification Position,” Idaho National Laboratory, Terry A. 
Tomberlin, April 2005. 
6. INL/INT-07-12817, “10 CFR 830 Major Modification Determination for the Hydraulic 
Shuttle Irradiation System at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR),” Idaho National 
Laboratory, S. R. Wagoner, June 2007. 
